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J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the
empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated
by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook
writers and other commentators, that Bell’s own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem
only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some
other such principle that (unlike local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway.
(Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the
view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell’s own.) Here we try to shed some light on the
situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell’s theorem, and, in
particular, by contrasting Bell’s own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been
the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We
point out a crucial difference between Jarrett’s and Bell’s own understanding of Bell’s formulation
of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many
others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, J.S. Bell proved the result now known as Bell’s
Theorem: any physical theory of a certain type must
make predictions (for a certain class of experiment) which
respect a so-called Bell Inequality. [1] Quantum Mechan-
ics (QM) predicts violations of the inequality, and sub-
sequent experiments establish convincingly (though not
without loopholes) that the Quantum Mechanical pre-
dictions are correct – i.e., the experiments establish that
the type of theory Bell showed must respect the Inequal-
ity, cannot be empirically viable, i.e., cannot be true. [2]
But the question (which has given rise to an enormous
literature) remains: what type of theory is it, exactly,
that Bell’s Theorem (combined with the associated ex-
periments) refutes?
Bell’s own view, expressed already in the opening lines
of his 1964 paper and subsequently clarified and defended
in virtually all of his later writings, was that “It is the
requirement of locality ... that creates the essential diffi-
culty.” (Bell, 1964, p. 14) By “locality” Bell here means
the prohibition, usually taken to be an implication of spe-
cial relativity (SR), of super-luminal (faster than light)
causation. Bell thus took his own theorem to establish a
troubling conflict between (the empirically verified pre-
dictions of) QM (i.e., between experiment) and SR:
“For me then this is the real problem with
quantum theory: the apparently essential
conflict between any sharp formulation and
fundamental relativity. That is to say, we
have an apparent incompatibility, at the
deepest level, between the two fundamental
pillars of contemporary theory...” (Bell, 1984,
p. 172)
Most practicing physicists, however, (and most philoso-
phers of physics) have disagreed with Bell and continued
to believe in the unproblematic consistency of QM and
SR. Where do they think Bell went wrong?
One can divide reasons for disagreement (with Bell’s
own interpretation of the significance of his theorem)
into two classes. First, there are those who assert that
the derivation of a Bell Inequality relies not just on
the premise of locality, but on some additional premises
as well. The usual suspects here include Realism,
Hidden Variables, Determinism, and Counter-Factual-
Definiteness. (Note that the items on this list are highly
overlapping, and often commentators use them inter-
changeably.) The idea is then that, since it is only the
conjunction of locality with some other premise which
is in conflict with experiment, and since locality is so
strongly motivated by SR, we should reject the other
premise. Hence the widespread reports that Bell’s the-
orem finally refutes the hidden variables program, the
principle of determinism, the philosophical notion of re-
alism, etc. [3]
Here is how Bell responded to this first class of dis-
agreement:
“My own first paper on this subject ...
starts with a summary of the EPR argu-
ment from locality to deterministic hidden
variables. But the commentators have almost
universally reported that it begins with de-
terministic hidden variables.” (Bell, 1981, p.
157)
Here (a footnote, but also in the main text of the ar-
ticle in question) Bell goes out of his way to stress the
overall logical structure of his two-part argument: first,
an argument from locality and certain predictions of QM
(namely, perfect anti-correlation for parallel spin mea-
surements on a pair of spin 1/2 particles in the spin sin-
glet state) to the existence of deterministic local hidden
2variables; and then second, from such variables to the
inequality, i.e., to a disagreement with certain other pre-
dictions of QM. This whole first class of disagreement
with Bell, then, rests on a simple confusion about Bell’s
argument. [4]
The more interesting and more subtle second class
of disagreement includes those who accept that the
empirically-violated Bell inequality can be derived from
Bell’s locality condition alone, but who argue that this
locality condition is too strong, i.e., that it smuggles in
some extra requirements beyond those minimally neces-
sary to respect SR’s prohibition on superluminal causa-
tion. At the head of this class is Jon Jarrett, whose 1983
PhD thesis and subsequent 1984 paper [5] argued that
Bell’s own local causality condition (which Jarrett calls
“strong locality”) is logically equivalent to the conjunc-
tion of two subsidiary conditions, which Jarrett described
respectively as “locality” and “completeness.”
Roughly speaking, Jarrett’s “locality” is the require-
ment that the outcome of a measurement on one particle
be independent of the type of measurement performed (at
spacelike separation) on a second particle (which, in the
interesting sorts of cases, is described by QM as being en-
tangled with the first particle). Jarrett’s “completeness”
on the other hand requires the outcome of the first mea-
surement to be independent of the outcome of the second,
spacelike separated measurement. He then argues that a
violation of “locality” would entail the ability to send
superluminal signals (Alice could learn something about
the setting of Bob’s measurement device by examining
the outcome of her own experiment) which would allow
Bob to transmit a signal across a spacelike interval, some-
thing clearly forbidden by SR. By contrast, a violation
of “completeness” indicates no conflict with SR. Thus,
Jarrett argues, in the face of the empirical data conflict-
ing with “strong locality” we may reject “completeness”
and thereby achieve – contra Bell – a kind of Peaceful
Coexistence between QM and SR. [6]
Jarrett’s project has been widely hailed and widely dis-
cussed. It was the immediate stimulus for almost every-
thing in the “Bell literature” for about a decade after
its appearance, and continues to set a broadly influential
context for much ongoing work in this area. [7]
The purpose of the present paper is to critically assess
Jarrett’s analysis and the conclusions it led him to, by
comparing his project side-by-side with Bell’s own discus-
sions of the relevant issues. In particular, I will claim that
Jarrett simply missed a crucial aspect (having something
to do with “completeness”) of Bell’s formulation of local
causality; this turns out to be the heart of the thinking
behind Jarrett’s (prima facie rather puzzling) terminol-
ogy for his two sub-conditions, as well as his central claim
that violations of his “completeness” criterion indicate no
conflict with special relativistic local causality. The main
conclusion is thus that, contrary to Jarrett and his fol-
lowers, Bell’s own local causality criterion is in no sense
“too strong.” And this of course undermines the attempt
to establish the Peaceful Coexistence of QM and SR, i.e.,
it supports Bell’s own interpretation of the meaning of
his theorem.
The following two sections present, respectively, Bell’s
own (final and most careful) formulation of the locality
premise, and then Jarrett’s analysis. Section IV includes
some comparative discussion, highlighting especially the
relation of Jarrett’s thinking to the EPR argument. A
brief final section then summarizes and concludes.
Before launching into this, however, it is appropriate
to briefly survey earlier criticisms of Jarrett’s analysis of
Bell’s locality concept. To my knowledge, the fullest crit-
ical discussion of Jarrett’s project is in Maudlin’s book.
[8] Maudlin’s main points vis-a-vis Jarrett are as follows:
(a) Jarrett’s identification of his “locality” sub-condition
with the prohibition on superluminal signals is wrong; (b)
Jarrett’s identification of superluminal signaling with su-
perluminal causation is wrong; (c) Jarrett’s claim that a
violation of his “completeness” condition does not entail
any nonlocal causation is wrong. [9]
The arguments for (a) and (b) are made clearly and
compellingly by Maudlin, who thus really demolishes Jar-
rett’s erroneous identification of his “locality” with the
relevant requirements of SR. But the case for (c) is made
only indirectly, essentially by dismissing Jarrett and re-
asserting Bell’s claim to the contrary. So, to be a bit
more precise about the goal of the present paper, the
aim is to fill this gap by exploring in detail how Jarrett’s
“completeness” condition relates to Bell’s local causal-
ity criterion and how Jarrett’s misunderstanding of the
latter led him to the various erroneous conclusions.
I should note at the outset, however, that the view
to be presented here as Jarrett’s is almost certainly a
bit misleading as to his (or those I consider his follow-
ers’) fully-considered views. Jarrett does actually say all
the things I attribute to him, but my gloss will perhaps
minimize the extent to which Jarrett (I would argue, in-
consistently) also acknowledges points in conflict with
the views I will attribute to him. It is probably best,
therefore, to understand the “Jarrett” discussed here as
a rhetorically clarifying construct, which may or may not
correspond to the views of the actual Jon Jarrett.
II. BELL’S CONCEPT OF LOCAL CAUSALITY
Bell’s fullest and evidently most-considered discussion
of local causality occurs in his last published paper, La
nouvelle cuisine (1990, 232-248). We will here essentially
follow that discussion, supplementing it occasionally with
things from his earlier papers.
Bell first introduces what he calls the “Principle of lo-
cal causality” as follows: “The direct causes (and effects)
of events are near by, and even the indirect causes (and
effects) are no further away than permitted by the veloc-
ity of light.” Then, referencing what has been reproduced
here as Figure 1, Bell elaborates: “Thus, for events in a
space-time region 1 ... we would look for causes in the
backward light cone, and for effects in the future light
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FIG. 1: “Space-time location of causes and effects of events
in region 1.” (Figure and caption are from Bell, 1990, p. 239.)
cone. In a region like 2, space-like separated from 1, we
would seek neither causes nor effects of events in 1. Of
course this does not mean that events in 1 and 2 might
not be correlated...” (1990, p. 239)
After remarking that this formulation “is not yet suffi-
ciently sharp and clean for mathematics,” Bell then pro-
poses the following version, referencing what has been
reproduced here as Figure 2:
“A theory will be said to be locally causal
if the probabilities attached to values of local
beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered
by specification of values of local beables in
a space-like separated region 2, when what
happens in the backward light cone of 1 is
already sufficiently specified, for example by
a full specification of local beables in a space-
time region 3...” (1990, 239-40)
Although Bell doesn’t immediately formulate this math-
ematically (which is curious, since he has just advertised
it as a formulation which is “sufficiently sharp and clean
for mathematics”), we may do so in a way that is clearly
(as evidenced by what comes later in the paper) what he
had in mind:
P (b1|B3, b2) = P (b1|B3). (1)
Here bi refers to some beable (or more precisely, its value)
in region i, and Bi refers to a “full specification” of be-
ables in region i. This simply asserts mathematically
what Bell states in the caption of his accompanying fig-
ure: “full specification of [beables] in 3 makes events
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1.” Note that Bell
here uses the term (which he had earlier coined) “beable”
(rhymes with “agreeable”) to denote whatever is posited,
by the candidate theory in question, to be physically real :
“The beables of the theory are those elements
which might correspond to elements of real-
ity, to things which exist. Their existence
does not depend on ‘observation’. Indeed ob-
servation and observers must be made out of
beables.” (1984, p. 174)
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FIG. 2: “Full specification of what happens in 3 makes events
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal the-
ory.” (Figure and caption are from Bell, 1990, p. 240.)
For further discussion of “beables” see Bell’s The Theory
of Local Beables (1975, pages 52-3), Beables for quantum
field theory (1984, pages 174-6), and La nouvelle cuisine
(1990, pages 234-5).
Bell then adds the following clarificatory remarks:
“It is important that region 3 completely
shields off from 1 the overlap of the back-
ward light cones of 1 and 2. And it is im-
portant that events in 3 be specified com-
pletely. Otherwise the traces in region 2 of
causes of events in 1 could well supplement
whatever else was being used for calculating
probabilities about 1. The hypothesis is that
any such information about 2 becomes redun-
dant when 3 is specified completely.” (1990,
p. 240)
It will be crucial to understand these remarks, so we shall
briefly elaborate.
First, suppose that the region labeled 3 in Figure 2
sliced across the backwards light cone of 1 at an earlier
time, such that it failed to “completely shield off from 1
the overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2.” See,
for example, the region labeled 3∗ in Figure 3. Why then
would a violation of Equation 1 (but with 3→ 3∗) fail to
necessarily indicate the presence of nonlocal causation?
Suppose we are dealing with a non-deterministic (i.e., ir-
reducibly stochastic, genuinely chancy) theory. And sup-
pose that some event (a beable we shall call “X”) comes
into existence in the future of this region 3∗, such that it
lies in the overlapping backwards light cones of 1 and 2.
By assumption, the theory in question did not allow the
prediction of this beable on the basis of a full specifica-
tion of beables in 3∗. Yet once X comes into existence,
it can (in a way that is perfectly consistent with local
causality) influence events in both 1 and 2. And there is
therefore the possibility that specification of events from
2 could allow one to infer something about X from which
one could in turn infer more about goings-on in 1 than
one could have inferred originally from just the full spec-
ification of beables in 3∗. In other words (Bell’s): “the
traces in region 2 of causes [such as our X] of events in 1
could well supplement whatever else was being used for
calculating probabilities about 1.” This mechanism for
producing violations of Equation 1 without any superlu-
minal causation, however, will clearly not be available so
4X
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FIG. 3: Similar to Figure 2, except that region 3∗ (unlike re-
gion 3 of Figure 2) fails to shield off region 1 from the overlap-
ping backward light cones of regions 1 and 2. Thus, (following
the language of Figure 2’s caption) even full specification of
what happens in 3∗ does not necessarily make events in 2
irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal theory.
long as “region 3 completely shields off from 1 the overlap
of the backward light cones of 1 and 2.”
Bell’s other clarification is also crucial. Suppose that
events in region 3 of Figure 2 are not specified completely.
We may denote such an incomplete description by B¯3.
Then does a violation of Equation 1 (but with B3 → B¯3)
necessarily imply the existence of any nonlocal causa-
tion? No, for it would then be possible that some event
X (again in the overlapping past light cones of 1 and 2)
influences both 1 and 2 such that information about 2
could tell us something about X which in turn could tell
us something about 1 which we couldn’t infer from B¯3.
We only need stipulate that the beables in region 3 which
“carry” the causal influence from X to 1 are (among)
those omitted by B¯3. But since there is, by definition,
no such omission in the complete specification B3, this
eventuality cannot arise, and a violation of Equation 1
must indicate the existence of some nonlocal causation,
i.e., causal influences not respecting Bell’s original “Prin-
ciple of local causality” (as displayed in Figure 1). [10]
It is worth noting that we cannot necessarily infer,
from a violation of Equation 1, that b2 exerts any di-
rect or indirect causal influence on b1. It might be, for
example, that a violation of Equation 1 is produced by
some X-like event lying in the future of region 3, which
causally influences both 1 and 2. But in order to exert a
local causal influence on 1, such an X would have to lie
outside the past light cone of 2 – and vice versa. What
is ensured by a violation of Equation 1 is thus only that
some violation of local causality (as sketched in Figure
1) is being posited somewhere by the theory in question.
Whether something in 2 is exerting a causal influence on
1 (or vice versa, or neither) the mere violation of Equa-
tion 1 doesn’t permit us to say. [11]
Note that everything in the above discussion refers to
some particular candidate physical theory. For example,
there is a tendency for misplaced skepticism to arise from
Bell’s use of the concept of “beables” in the formulation
of local causality. This term strikes the ears of those in-
fluenced by orthodox quantum philosophy as having a
metaphysical character and/or possibly committing one
(already, in the very definition of what it means for a the-
ory to respect relativistic local causality) to something
unorthodox like “realism” or “hidden variables.” Such
concerns, however, are based on the failure to appreciate
that the concept “beable” is theory-relative. “Beable”
refers not to what is physically real, but to what some
candidate theory posits as being physically real. Bell
writes: “I use the term ‘beable’ rather than some more
committed term like ‘being’ or ‘beer’ to recall the essen-
tially tentative nature of any physical theory. Such a
theory is at best a candidate for the description of na-
ture. Terms like ‘being’, ‘beer’, ‘existent’, etc., would
seem to me lacking in humility. In fact ‘beable’ is short
for ‘maybe-able’.” (1984, p. 174)
Similar considerations apply to the notion of “com-
pleteness” that is, as stressed above, essential to Bell’s
formulation. A complete specification of beables in some
spacetime region simply means a specification of every-
thing (relevant) that is posited by the candidate theory
in question. There is no presumption that such a full
specification actually correspond to what really exists in
the relevant spacetime region, i.e., no presumption that
the candidate theory in question is true. And the same
goes for the probabilities in Equation 1 that Bell’s lo-
cality criterion is formulated in terms of. These should
be read not as empirical frequencies or subjective mea-
sures of expectation, but as the fundamental dynamical
probabilities described by the candidate theory in ques-
tion (which we assume, without loss of generality, to be
irreducibly stochastic). [12]
Since all the crucial aspects of Bell’s formulation of
locality are thus meaningful only relative to some candi-
date theory, it is perhaps puzzling how Bell thought we
could say anything about the locally causal character of
Nature. Wouldn’t the locality condition only allow us
to assess the local character of candidate theories? It is
important to understand that the answer is essentially
(at least initially): Yes! Indeed, note that Bell begins
the formulation with “A theory will be said to be locally
causal if...” (emphasis added). Let us state it openly and
explicitly: Bell’s locality criterion is a way of distinguish-
ing local theories from nonlocal ones:
“I would insist here on the distinction be-
tween analyzing various physical theories, on
the one hand, and philosophising about the
unique real world on the other hand. In this
matter of causality it is a great inconvenience
that the real world is given to us once only.
We cannot know [by looking] what would
have happened if something had been differ-
ent. We cannot repeat an experiment chang-
ing just one variable; the hands of the clock
will have moved, and the moons of Jupiter.
Physical theories are more amenable in this
respect. We can calculate the consequences
of changing free elements in a theory, be they
only initial conditions, and so can explore the
causal structure of the theory. I insist that
[my concept of local causality] is primarily an
analysis of certain kinds of physical theory.”
5(1977, p. 101)
How then did Bell think we could end up saying some-
thing interesting about Nature? That is precisely the
beauty of Bell’s theorem, which shows that no theory
respecting the locality condition (no matter what other
properties it may or may not have – e.g., hidden variables
or only the non-hidden sort, deterministic or stochastic,
particles or fields or both or neither, etc.) can agree
with the empirically-verified QM predictions for certain
types of experiment. That is (and leaving aside the var-
ious experimental loopholes), no locally causal theory in
Bell’s sense can agree with experiment, can be empiri-
cally viable, can be true. Which means the true theory
(whatever it might be) necessarily violates Bell’s locality
condition. Nature is not locally causal. [13]
For ease of future reference and to fix some terminol-
ogy, it will be helpful to lay out here a bit more explicitly
the type of setup involved in the Bell experiments, and
to indicate precisely how one gets from locality as formu-
lated by Bell to the somewhat different-looking math-
ematical condition (sometimes called “factorizability”)
from which standard derivations of Bell’s inequality pro-
ceed.
The setup relevant to Bell’s theorem involves a parti-
cle source which emits pairs of spin-correlated particles,
and two spatially separated devices each of which allows
measurement of one of several spin components on the
respective incident particle. (In actual experiments, the
particles are typically photons with polarization playing
the role of “spin.”) Two experimenters, traditionally Al-
ice and Bob, man the two devices. We use the symbols
aˆ and bˆ to refer, respectively, to the “settings” of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s apparatus (one usually thinks here of an
axis in space along which the polarizer or Stern-Gerlach
magnetic field is oriented), and A and B to refer to the
“outcomes” of their respective spin-component measure-
ments. Finally, we will use the symbol λ to refer to the
“state of the particle pair.” The scare-quotes around the
various terms here are an advertisement for the following
discussion.
First, note that all of the symbols just introduced re-
fer to beables. There is a tendency in the literature for
all of these things (the apparatus settings, the outcomes,
and the physical state of the particle pair) to remain
needlessly abstract. But all of these things are perfectly
concrete, at least relative to some particular candidate
theory. The setting of Alice’s apparatus, for example,
refers to something like the spatial orientation of a Stern-
Gerlach device, or some sort of knob or lever on some
more black-box-ish device. Thus, this “setting” ulti-
mately comes down to the spatial configuration of some
physically real matter, i.e., it must be reflected somehow
in the beables posited by any serious candidate theory.
[14]
Likewise, the outcome of Alice’s experiment is not
some ethereal event taking place in Alice’s conscious-
ness or some other place about which serious candidate
physical theories fail to speak directly. Rather, the out-
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FIG. 4: Space-time diagram illustrating the various beables
of relevance for a discussion of factorization. Separated ob-
servers Alice and Bob make spin-component measurements
(using apparatus characterized by variables aˆ and bˆ respec-
tively) of a pair of entangled spin-1/2 particles. The state
of the particles (and/or any other appropriately associated
beables) is denoted λ, and the outcomes of the two measure-
ments are represented by the beables A (in region 1) and B
(in region 2). Note that λ and aˆ jointly constitute a complete
specification of beables in space-time region 3a, which shields
off region 1 from the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and 2.
Likewise, λ and bˆ jointly constitute a complete specification
of beables in space-time region 3b, which shields off region 2
from the overlap of the past light cones of 2 and 1. Thus the
joint specification of λ and aˆ will – in a locally causal theory
– make bˆ and B redundant for a theory’s predictions about
A (and likewise, specification of λ and bˆ will render aˆ and A
redundant for predictions about B).
come should be thought of as being displayed in the post-
measurement position of a pointer (or the arrangement
of some ink on a piece of paper, etc.) – in short, the
outcome too is just a convenient way of referring to some
physically real and directly observable configuration of
matter, and so will necessarily be reflected in the beables
posited by any serious candidate theory. The case with
λ is a little different, because this is not something to
which we have any sort of direct observational access.
But this only means there is significantly more freedom
about what sort of beables λ might refer to in various
different candidate theories.
The basic space-time structure of the setup in question
is sketched in Figure 4, and the overall logic is explained
in the caption. The idea is simply to apply Bell’s locality
condition to the two measurement outcomes A and B in
order to assert that the probability assigned to a given
outcome (by a locally causal candidate theory) should
be independent of both the setting and outcome of the
distant experiment. That is, in a locally causal theory,
we must have
P (A|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ) = P (A|aˆ, λ) (2)
and
P (B|aˆ, bˆ, A, λ) = P (B|bˆ, λ). (3)
It is then trivial to apply the definition of conditional
probability to arrive at the conclusion that the joint prob-
ability (for outcomes A and B) factorizes :
P (A,B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (A|aˆ, λ)× P (B|bˆ, λ). (4)
6Bell writes: “Very often such factorizability is taken as
the starting point of the analysis. Here we have preferred
to see it not as the formulation of ‘local causality’, but
as a consequence thereof.” (1990, p. 243)
It is also important that the apparatus settings aˆ and
bˆ are in some sense “free.” This is often discussed in
terms of Alice and Bob making literal last-minute free-
will choices about how to orient their devices. What is
actually required for the proof is merely the assumption
that aˆ and bˆ are (stochastically) independent of the par-
ticle pair state λ. This comes up in the course of the
derivation of Bell’s inequality when we write an expres-
sion for predicted empirical frequency of a certain joint
outcome as a weighted average over the candidate the-
ory’s predictions for a given λ – that is,
E(A,B|aˆ, bˆ) =
∫
dλP (A,B|aˆ, bˆ, λ)P (λ) (5)
where P (λ) is the probability that a given particle pair
state λ is produced by the preparation procedure used at
the source.
If the probability distribution P (λ) actually depended
on aˆ or bˆ – as one would expect if the particle pair exerted
some causal influence on the settings (or vice versa!) or if
the particle pair and the settings were mutually causally
influenced in some non-trivial way by events farther back
in the past – then the above expression for the empirical
frequency would be invalid and the derivation of the Bell
inequality wouldn’t go through. [15]
This might seem like cause for concern, especially con-
sidering that (as displayed in Figure 4) the past light
cones of aˆ and bˆ overlap with the region containing λ
– and λ by definition is supposed to contain a complete
specification of beables in this region. Given all that,
one wonders how aˆ and bˆ could possibly not be causally
influenced by λ (in a locally causal theory).
Here we see the reason for another aspect of Bell’s
carefully-phrased formulation of locality, which requires
that beables in (the relevant) “region 3” (which will of
course be two different regions for the two measurements)
be “sufficiently specified, for example by a full specifica-
tion...” Here there is the implication that a specification
could be sufficient without being complete. For example,
some candidate theory (and this is actually true of every
serious extant candidate theory) might provide a specifi-
cation of the state of the particle pair which is sufficient
in the relevant sense, even though it leaves out some fact
(say, the millionth digit of the energy of some relic mi-
crowave background photon that happens to fly into the
detection region just prior to the measurement) which
actually exists in the relevant spacetime region. Such
a fact could then be allowed to determine the setting aˆ
without introducing even the slightest evidence for the
problematic sort of correlation between aˆ and λ. [16] In-
deed, this is just an exaggerated version of what happens
in the actual experiments, where carefully-isolated and
independent pseudo-random-number generators are used
to produce the settings at the two stations.
Finally, as Shimony, Horne, and Clauser have pointed
out,
“In any scientific experiment in which two or
more variables are supposed to be randomly
selected, one can always conjecture that some
factor in the overlap of the backward light
cones has controlled the presumably random
choices. But, we maintain, skepticism of this
sort will essentially dismiss all results of sci-
entific experimentation. Unless we proceed
under the assumption that hidden conspira-
cies of this sort do not occur, we have aban-
doned in advance the whole enterprise of dis-
covering the laws of nature by experimenta-
tion. [Hence, the extra] supposition needed
[to derive Bell’s inequality from Bell’s locality
condition] is no stronger than one needs for
experimental reasoning generically, and nev-
ertheless just strong enough to yield the de-
sired inequality.” [17]
So in the end there is really nothing worth worrying
about here, i.e., nothing which, in the face of the experi-
mental data conflicting with Bell’s inequalities, one might
reasonably reject as an alternative to rejecting Bell’s local
causality. What is important is that Equation 4 (along
with the “freedom” or “no conspiracies” assumption just
discussed) entails the Bell inequality. The derivation is
standard and will not be repeated here. [18] We will
instead simply note that (starting in 1975) Bell almost
always referred to the empirically testable inequality as
the “locality inequality.” One can hopefully now appre-
ciate why.
One final caveat. There is a sense in which our ver-
bal description of the meanings of the relevant beables
(aˆ, bˆ, A, B, and λ) is potentially confusing. For exam-
ple, there is no sense in which Bell makes some dubious
“extra assumption” that, e.g., particles fly from the “par-
ticle source” to the measurement devices. [19] A theory
which posits no particle beables, but only (say) waves
or a wave function or whatever is perfectly fine and the
formal locality criterion will apply to it just the same
way. Only the words would need to change. Relatedly,
many papers in the Bell literature raise issues about hid-
den variables associated not with the particle pair, but
with the measurement devices. Have we excluded such
variables, since our aˆ refers only to some knob setting on
Alice’s device and λ refers only to the state of the particle
pair? No. The only important distinction here is that aˆ
and bˆ refer to beables which are “free” (or “random”) in
the above sense, while the variables λ are somehow set
by past events.
This is no doubt a fuzzy distinction, but nothing im-
portant hinges on it. The point is that any microscopic
features of Alice’s device (hidden or not) – or anything
else relevant to the candidate theory’s predictions for the
probabilities in question – can be included under the “set-
ting” variables (aˆ, bˆ) or the “particle state” variables (λ),
7whichever seems more natural. In short, Bell’s formula-
tion of locality is significantly more general than might
otherwise be suggested by some of the words used to de-
scribe it.
III. JARRETT’S ANALYSIS
Jon Jarrett’s influential analysis of Bell’s locality cri-
terion begins with Equations 2 and 3, which he dubs
“strong locality.” (Of course, we are innocuously chang-
ing – and occasionally simplifying – Jarrett’s notation to
make it consistent with that introduced above.) For sim-
plicity, let us focus the discussion on Equation 2. Jarrett
defines two sub-conditions which, he subsequently proves,
are jointly equivalent to this “strong locality.”
The first sub-condition Jarrett dubs “locality.” (It is
also sometimes referred to as “simple locality” or “param-
eter independence” or “remote context independence” in
the literature.)
P (A|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (A|aˆ, λ). (6)
As Jarrett explains, “Locality requires that the probabil-
ity for the outcome [A] ... be determined ‘locally’; i.e.,
that it depend only on the state λ ... of the two-particle
system and on the state [aˆ] of the measuring device. In
particular, that probability must be independent of which
(if any) component of spin the distant measuring device
is set to measure.” [20]
Jarrett’s second sub-condition, which he dubs “com-
pleteness” (and is also known as “predictive complete-
ness,” “outcome independence,” “remote outcome inde-
pendence” and “conditional outcome independence”) is
the following:
P (A|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ) = P (A|aˆ, bˆ, λ) (7)
which “asserts the stochastic independence of the two
outcomes in each pair of spin measurements.” [21]
It is easy to see that, indeed, “locality” and “com-
pleteness” are jointly equivalent to Bell’s locality condi-
tion as expressed in Equation 2. First, P (A|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ)
is, under the assumption of “completeness,” equal to
P (A|aˆ, bˆ, λ). And this, in turn, is equal to P (A|aˆ, λ)
under the assumption of “locality”. So “locality” and
“completeness” jointly entail “strong locality.” And like-
wise “strong locality” clearly entails both “locality” and
“completeness.” So the two sub-conditions are, indeed,
equivalent to Equation 2.
The alleged significance of this decomposition, how-
ever, emerges only from Jarrett’s discussion of the phys-
ical interpretation of his two sub-conditions.
First, Jarrett argues that “locality” is equivalent to
the prohibition of superluminal signaling, and hence ex-
presses just what relativity requires of other theories. As
was mentioned in the introduction, both steps of this ar-
gument have been found wanting. First, it is only in
combination with some assumptions about the control-
lability of various beables (notably λ) that Jarrett’s “lo-
cality” is equivalent to the prohibition on superluminal
signaling. There is at least one extant, empirically viable
theory (Bohmian Mechanics) which violates Jarrett’s “lo-
cality” condition and yet doesn’t permit the possibility
of superluminal signaling, precisely because the relevant
states cannot (as a matter of principle, as predicted by
the theory) be sufficiently controlled. And second, it is
dubious to claim that the prohibition of superluminal sig-
nals adequately captures relativity’s fundamental speed
limit. This would, for example, render Bohmian Me-
chanics consistent with SR despite its need to postulate
a dynamically privileged reference frame – a “gross vio-
lation of relativistic causality” according to Bell. (1984,
p. 171) But since these problems have been discussed
elsewhere in the literature, we leave them aside here and
focus instead on Jarrett’s physical interpretation of his
second sub-condition, “completeness.”
Jarrett elaborates the meaning of his “completeness”
condition with the following example:
“A simple (and incorrect) model for the Bell-
type correlated spin phenomena may serve as
a useful illustration. Suppose, purely for the
sake of illustration, that spin is correctly rep-
resented as an ordinary classical angular mo-
mentum. Suppose further that when a pair of
particles is prepared in the singlet state, the
spin vectors for the two particles are aligned
exactly anti-parallel to each other. Moreover,
given an ensemble of such two-particle sys-
tems, suppose that each direction in space is
equally likely to be the direction of alignment
for an arbitrarily selected member of the en-
semble. Finally, if the unit vector [aˆ] gives the
direction along which the axis of the Stern-
Gerlach apparatus is aligned ... and if [sˆ] is
the spin vector of the particle ... then the out-
come of that measurement is +1 if [aˆ · sˆ > 0]
and −1 if [aˆ · sˆ < 0].
Jarrett then makes what amounts to the following point:
for this model, we clearly have that Alice’s particle (from
a randomly selected member of the ensemble) is equally
likely to be found in the A = +1 and A = −1 states
along any arbitrary direction aˆ. Thus, for example,
P (A=+1|aˆ, bˆ, λ) =
1
2
(8)
where λ is the singlet state – evidently meaning, in the
context of this example, the state description according
to which the particle has some definite but completely
unknown spin direction sˆ.
On the other hand, it is built into the model that,
for aˆ = bˆ, the outcomes of Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ments will be perfectly anti-correlated. Hence, if we ad-
ditionally specify the outcome of Bob’s experiment, the
8outcome of Alice’s is fixed. Suppose, for example, that
B = +1. Then A = +1 is forbidden, i.e.,
P (A=+1|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ) = 0. (9)
Comparing the previous two equations, we see that “com-
pleteness is clearly violated.” [22]
Jarrett elaborates:
“The probabilities specified for this model are
grounded in a blatantly incomplete descrip-
tion of the two-particle state. In the context
of this model, if the theory assigns probabil-
ities only on the basis of the occupancy by
the two-particle system of the singlet state,
then conditioning on the outcome [B] of a [bˆ]-
component spin measurement on [Bob’s par-
ticle] may well yield a different probability
for the outcome of a spin measurement on
[Alice’s particle] than would have been given
by the corresponding unconditioned proba-
bility (i.e., 1/2). This is so because, if the
outcome of the measurement on [Bob’s par-
ticle] is +1 [and if aˆ = bˆ], then it may be
inferred that [aˆ · sˆA < 0] (with probability
1), where [sˆA] is the spin of Alice’s particle....
The outcome of the measurement on [Bob’s
particle thus] provides information about [Al-
ice’s particle] which was not included in the
incomplete state description [λ].” [23]
The important conclusion is this: the fact that the prob-
ability assigned to a certain outcome for Alice’s exper-
iment depends, in violation of Equation 7, on the out-
come of Bob’s experiment, does not mean that there is
any relativistically-forbidden superluminal causal influ-
ence (e.g., from Bob’s outcome to Alice’s). That is the
whole point of the illustrative example, in which (by as-
sumption) the outcome of Alice’s experiment is deter-
mined exclusively by factors (namely aˆ and sˆA) which
are present at her location. No nonlocal causal influence
exists. Instead, the violation of Equation 7 indicates only
that we were dealing with incomplete state descriptions,
such that Bob’s outcome provides some information (use-
fully supplementing what was already contained in λ)
which warrants an updating of probabilities.
On the basis of this example, Jarrett thus urges the fol-
lowing physical interpretation of his two sub-conditions:
a violation of “locality” would allow the possibility of
sending superluminal signals, and hence indicates clearly
the existence of some relativity-violating superluminal
causal influences; on the other hand, a violation of
“completeness” does not indicate the existence of any
relativity-violating influences, but instead suggests only
that the state descriptions of the theory in question are
not complete. It is clear that these physical interpreta-
tions of the two conditions were the basis for Jarrett’s
decision to name them “locality” and “completeness” re-
spectively.
Here is Jarrett’s summary of the cash value of this de-
composition vis-a-vis Bell’s theorem and the associated
experiments: these together provide very strong evidence
“that strong locality cannot be satisfied by any empiri-
cally adequate theory. Since locality is contravened only
on pain of a serious conflict with relativity theory (which
is extraordinarily well-confirmed independently), it is ap-
propriate to assign the blame to the completeness con-
dition. ...[O]ne must conclude that certain phenomena
simply cannot be adequately represented by any theory
which ascribes properties to the entities it posits in such a
way that no measurement on the system may yield infor-
mation which is both non-redundant (not deducible from
the state descriptions) and predictively relevant for dis-
tant measurements. That ‘information’ is not (neither
explicitly nor implicitly) contained in the ‘incomplete’
state description.” [24]
IV. COMPARISON
The fundamental origin of the disagreement between
Bell and Jarrett should now be clear: the two authors
do not understand (e.g.) Equation 2 in the same way.
For Bell, the variables λ in this formula (together with aˆ
as per the previous discussion) constitute a complete (or
perhaps merely sufficient) specification of beables in some
space-time region that has the same relation to Alice’s
experiment that region 3 (of Figure 1) had to region 1.
Jarrett, by contrast, is agnostic about the completeness
of the description afforded by λ.
Strictly speaking, therefore, Jarrett’s decomposition of
Equation 2 is not a decomposition of Bell’s locality con-
dition, but, rather, a decomposition of some sort of no-
correlation condition
P (b1|B¯3, b2) = P (b1|B¯3) (10)
which is analogous to Equation 1, except that, following
the notation of Section II, the variables B¯3 are not as-
sumed to provide a complete specification of beables in
the relevant spacetime region. But as we have already
discussed in Section II, and as Bell was perfectly aware,
a violation of Equation 10 does not necessarily indicate
the presence of any nonlocal causation in the candidate
theory in question. Indeed, it is precisely to close off
the avenue eventually taken by Jarrett (that is, blam-
ing a violation of this “no-correlation” condition on the
incompleteness of the specified beables) that Bell specifi-
cally stresses the importance that “events in [the relevant
region] be specified completely.” (1990, p. 240)
This confusion – this departure from Bell’s actual lo-
cality criterion – is the ultimate basis for Jarrett’s choice
of terminology, and also for any initial plausibility of his
project of establishing “Peaceful Coexistence” by show-
ing that a violation of the locality criterion needed for
Bell’s inequality (in particular, a violation of his “com-
pleteness” sub-condition) need not indicate any conflict
with relativistic local causality.
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tion strategy to Bell’s actual locality condition. That is,
it is true that, as Jarrett claimed to have shown, Bell’s lo-
cality condition can be decomposed into two Jarrett-like
sub-conditions – namely, our Equations 6 and 7 but now
with the requirement (inherited from Bell’s actual local-
ity condition) that λ provide a complete (or sufficient)
specification of relevant beables (as posited by some can-
didate theory whose locality is being assessed by the lo-
cality condition). But this decomposition fails to have
any of the physical implications urged by Jarrett. In par-
ticular, a violation of the (strengthened) “completeness”
condition
P (A|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ) = P (A|aˆ, bˆ, λ) (11)
(formally equivalent to Jarrett’s “completeness” sub-
condition, but now, with Bell but contra Jarrett, with
the insistence that λ and aˆ jointly provide a complete de-
scription of beables in some spacetime region through the
past of A which divides A off completely from the overlap
of the past light cones of A and B) has absolutely noth-
ing to do with the completeness of state descriptions, but
instead indicates the presence of some nonlocal causation
(in violation of the causal structure outlined in Figure 1)
in the candidate theory in question.
The most that could be said to distinguish the two sub-
conditions is that, since bˆ is (by definition) controllable
and B (most likely) isn’t, a violation of 6 is (all other
things being equal) more likely to yield the possibility of
superluminal signaling than a violation of 7. But that
only matters if we drop what Bell calls “fundamental
relativity” and instead read SR instrumentally, as pro-
hibiting superluminal signalling but allowing in principle
superluminal causation (so long as it can’t be harnessed
by humans to transmit messages). That is, at best, a
dubious and controversial reading of SR, as already men-
tioned. [25]
It is sometimes suggested [26] that the relation between
Bell and Jarrett on this point is one of basic agreement,
since both held that the validity of Equation 7 has some-
thing to do with the completeness of the physical theory
in question. This is doubly incorrect. First, the mathe-
matical condition in question is, for Jarrett, a formulation
of completeness; it is, for Bell, (part of) a formulation of
local causality which functions appropriately as such only
if the relevant symbols in the formula stand for a complete
specification of the relevant beables. According to Jarrett,
Equation 7 is supposed to tell us whether completeness
holds. For Bell, on the other hand, the equation (cor-
rectly understood) already presupposes that complete-
ness holds. (If it doesn’t hold, the condition is useless
for his purposes, and states only that the two outcomes
are uncorrelated.) And second, where Jarrett (and most
subsequent commentators) regard the “completeness” in
question as a property of theories, Bell regards his “com-
pleteness” as a property of a certain specification of be-
ables relative to some candidate theory. In this context,
the separate question of whether the theory itself is com-
plete (i.e., whether its posited beables capture everything
that really exists) simply doesn’t come up.
Note also that, even on his own terms, i.e., even leaving
aside his departure from Bell’s actual locality criterion,
Jarrett’s formulation of completeness actually fails as a
criterion for assessing the completeness of the relevant
physical state descriptions.
Consider again Equation 7 where for the moment we
follow Jarrett and interpret λ here as providing some kind
of state description, but not necessarily a complete one.
Jarrett has shown (with the example discussed in Section
III) that a violation of this condition can sometimes be
blamed on the use of incomplete state descriptions, with
no implication of any superluminal causation. But it is
equally easy to display an example in which violation
of Jarrett’s condition cannot be blamed on incomplete
state descriptions, but instead indicates the presence of
superluminal causation.
Consider a toy model discussed by Maudlin, in which
each particle in the pair is indeterminate (in regard to its
spin along any particular direction) until one of the par-
ticles encounters a spin-measurement apparatus; at this
point, this “first” particle flips a coin to decide whether
to emerge from the +1 or the −1 port of the apparatus,
and sends an instantaneous tachyon signal to the other
particle in the pair, instructing it as to how it should
behave in order to give rise to the correct quantum me-
chanical joint outcomes. [27] Assuming, as before, that
aˆ = bˆ, and that Bob’s particle arrives at its detector first
[28] with the result B = +1, this model makes the same
predictions, Equations 8 and 9, as the local deterministic
model discussed by Jarrett. And so this model, like Jar-
rett’s, violates Jarrett’s “completeness” condition. And
yet clearly with this model there is no blaming that viola-
tion on the use of incomplete state descriptions – instead
here it is obvious (by construction) that the violation is
due to the presence of superluminal causal influences (in
the particular form of “tachyon signals”).
This should not be surprising. We have already ar-
gued that, if one follows Bell in requiring λ to constitute
a complete state description, then a violation of Jarrett’s
“completeness” can only be understood as indicating the
presence of nonlocal causation. The point here is that,
even if we follow Jarrett in remaining agnostic about the
completeness of the description afforded by λ, we can-
not necessarily say that a violation of “completeness” is
compatible with relativity’s prohibition on superluminal
causation. It might be (as shown by Jarrett’s model).
But it might not be (as shown by Maudlin’s).
The correct conclusion is therefore as follows: a vio-
lation of Jarrett’s “completeness” condition (where we
are openly agnostic about the completeness of the state
description λ) means either that we have relativity-
violating nonlocal causation, or that we were dealing
with incomplete state descriptions. And this dilemma is
precisely that posed already in 1935 by Einstein, Podol-
sky, and Rosen: either we concede Bohr’s claim that the
QM description of states is complete and accept the re-
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ality of the nonlocal causation present in that theory; or
we reject the completeness claim and adopt a different
(“hidden variables”) theory which (the authors thought)
could restore locality. [29]
Jarrett also sees a similarity between his conclusion
and that of EPR (namely that QM is not complete). But
where EPR considered this a defect to be corrected in
some alternative “hidden variable” theory (which they
hoped would also restore local causality), Jarrett argues
that incompleteness is not a defect of orthodox QM, but,
rather, a fact of nature:
“By separating out the relativistic compo-
nent of the strong locality condition ... there
emerges a clarification of that class of theo-
ries excluded by the Bell arguments: the class
of theories which satisfy completeness. Al-
though the term ‘incompleteness’ may con-
note a defect (as if, as was the case for the
model discussed [above], all incomplete theo-
ries may be ‘completed ’), incomplete theories
(e.g., quantum mechanics) are by no means
ipso facto defective. On the contrary, when
the result of Bell-type experiments are taken
into account, the truly remarkable implica-
tion of Bell’s Theorem is that incomplete-
ness, in some sense, is a genuine feature of
the world itself.” [30]
This sort of claim is echoed also in Jarrett’s later writings.
[31]
Ballentine and Jarrett also give an argument that the
“completeness” of interest to EPR is a stronger form of
Jarrett’s “completeness” in the sense that the former en-
tails the latter. (This occurs in the context of their agree-
ing with EPR that QM is incomplete, which they estab-
lish by arguing that, since the correct conclusion from
Bell/experiment is that Jarrett’s “completeness” condi-
tion fails, then the stronger EPR completeness condition
must also fail, just as the EPR authors claimed.) But
this association is mistaken, since the argument Ballen-
tine and Jarrett display sneaks in the additional premise
of (EPR’s version of) local causality. [32] And this is
the premise that does (literally) all the work in the EPR
argument.
There is thus no apparent sense at all in which EPR’s
completeness has anything to do with Jarrett’s, except
that it was precisely in the face of QM’s violation of Jar-
rett’s “completeness” that EPR argued (correctly) that
QM was a non-local theory which, perhaps, could be re-
placed by a locally causal alternative theory by adding
hidden variables (or jettisoning the description in terms
of wave functions entirely). Indeed, at the end of the day,
it is pretty clear that Jarrett’s condition has nothing to
do with the completeness of physical state descriptions.
In concluding (from Bell’s Theorem and the associated
experiments) that reality itself is “in some sense” incom-
plete, Jarrett makes clear that he is no longer using the
term with anything like its ordinary meaning – namely, a
description which leaves nothing (relevant) out. By what
standard, exactly, could “the world itself” be supposed
to have left something out?
It is worth stepping back, therefore, and clarifying
what, if anything, one can say about “completeness.”
There are two related senses on the table. First of all,
a theory may be said to be “complete” or “incomplete”
in relation to external physical reality. In this sense, a
theory is complete if and only if it captures or describes
everything (relevant) that in fact really exists. This is
of course just the sense of completeness of interest to
EPR. Their argument, in essence, was that relativistic
local causality (which they simply took for granted) com-
bined with certain empirical predictions of QM entailed
the existence of some “elements of reality” which had no
counterpart in the QM description of reality. That is,
the QM description left something out; it was hence an
incomplete theory.
Since this usage of “completeness” involves a compar-
ison between theories and external reality (to which our
best access is precisely through theories!), there is a ten-
dency for it to be regarded as “metaphysical”. Perhaps
this apparently metaphysical flavor is responsible for Jar-
rett’s suppression of Bell’s requirement that λ contain
a complete specification of the relevant beables. Since
there’d be no way to verify whether a given specification
was or wasn’t complete in this sense, one might think,
Bell’s requirement is meaningless and might as well just
be dropped.
But this attitude fails to appreciate one of Bell’s im-
portant advances – namely, that his formulation of local
causality is a criterion for assessing the locality of candi-
date theories. As already discussed in Section II, Bell’s
“complete specification of beables” simply does not mean
a specification that captures everything which in fact re-
ally exists; rather, it means a specification which captures
everything which is posited to exist by some candidate
theory. There is thus nothing the least bit metaphysical
or obscure about Bell’s requirement. For any unambigu-
ously formulated candidate theory, there should be no
question about what is being posited to exist. And so
there will be no ambiguity about what a complete de-
scription of relevant beables should consist of, and hence
no ambiguity about the status – vis-a-vis local causality
– of a given well-formulated theory.
There will of course still be difficult questions about
how to decide whether a given candidate theory is true,
and hence whether the particular sort of non-local cau-
sation contained in it accurately describes some aspect
of Nature. But the miracle of Bell’s argument is that we
need not know which theory is true, in order to know that
the true theory (whatever it turns out to be) will have to
exhibit non-local, super-luminal causation. There is thus
no escaping Bell’s conclusion that some sort of non-local
causation (in violation of the structure displayed in Fig-
ure 1) exists in Nature – in apparent conflict with what
most physicists take to be the requirements of SR.
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V. DISCUSSION
In the previous section, we interpreted Jarrett as claim-
ing that a violation of his “completeness” condition in
no way implied the presence of non-local causation, but
instead only implied that the state descriptions used in
the test had been incomplete. This is both fair and un-
fair – fair because Jarrett does hang his entire case for
the plausibility of his terminology and his physical in-
terpretation of the two sub-conditions on precisely this
view, but also unfair because Jarrett also later seems to
acknowledge that, ultimately, his “completeness” condi-
tion has to be understood very differently. For exam-
ple, he remarks in a footnote that “completeness, too,
has the character of a ‘locality’ condition.” [33] And
the trend in the Bell literature since Jarrett’s paper has
certainly been to concede that a violation of Jarrett’s
“completeness” cannot be quite so trivially written off
(as involving a mere updating of information in the face
of having previously used incomplete state descriptions),
but rather must be understood as indicating some sort
of non-locality or “holism” or “non-separability” or non-
causal “passion at a distance.”
We do not, therefore, wish to claim that Jarrett (and
those who follow him in thinking his decomposition is in
some way or other helpful in understanding Bell’s locality
condition and/or in establishing the peaceful coexistence
of SR and QM [34] ) fully commits precisely the mistake
presented (through the stark contrast to Bell’s views) in
the previous section. Rather, we intend only the weaker
claim that Jarrett et al. have been led, by Jarrett’s ini-
tial analysis, down a path which is obviously untenable
once one clearly understands Bell’s own formulation of
local causality (including especially the parallel status –
namely, both are beables – of “settings” and “outcomes,”
and the crucial distinction between superluminal causa-
tion and superluminal signaling).
It turns out to be a rather subtle question whether or
not SR genuinely requires local causality in the sense of
Figure 1. [35] But if one grants this (and virtually all
physicists and commentators do), then it really is possi-
ble to establish an
“essential conflict between any sharp formu-
lation [of QM] and fundamental relativity.
That is to say, we have an apparent incom-
patibility, at the deepest level, between the
two fundamental pillars of contemporary the-
ory...” (Bell, 1984, p. 172)
The widespread claims to the contrary – i.e., the claims
that instead Bell’s theorem refutes only some already-
dubious, dogmatic, philosophically-motivated program
to restore “determinism” or “classicality” or “realism”
(and I mean here both classes of such claims mentioned
in the introduction) – turn out inevitably to have their
roots in a failure to appreciate some aspect of Bell’s own
arguments.
There is, in particular, a tendency for a relatively su-
perficial focus on the relatively formal aspects of Bell’s ar-
guments, to lead commentators astray. For example, how
many commentators have too-quickly breezed through
the prosaic first section of Bell’s 1964 paper (p. 14-
21) – where his reliance on the EPR argument “from
locality to deterministic hidden variables” is made clear
– and simply jumped ahead to section 2’s Equation 1
(p. 15), hence erroneously inferring (and subsequently
reporting to other physicists and ultimately teaching to
students) that the derivation “begins with deterministic
hidden variables”? (1981, p. 157) Likewise, we have here
explored in detail a similar case of too-quickly accepting
some formal version of a premise used in Bell’s derivation
(such as “factorizability”) while failing to appreciate the
rich conceptual context that gives it the precise meaning
Bell intended.
Our final conclusion, therefore, is a plea – directed at
physicists in general, but commentators on Bell’s theo-
rem, textbook writers, and students in particular – to
simply read (and not just read, but read) Bell’s writings.
They are truly a model of clarity and physical insight,
and almost always convey the essential ideas much more
lucidly and tersely than anything in the secondary Bell
literature. (I have no doubt this applies even to the cur-
rent essay!) Bell himself, in the preface to the first edi-
tion of his compiled papers (Speakable and Unspeakable in
Quantum Mechanics) suggests that “even quantum ex-
perts might begin with [chapter] 16, ‘Bertlmann’s socks
and the nature of reality’, not skipping the slightly more
technical material at the end.” It is hard to disagree with
that advice, although a strong case could be made also
for Bell’s 1990 essay (written after the first edition of the
book, and hence included only in the more recent second
edition) ‘La nouvelle cuisine,’ in which the central impor-
tance and meaning of “local causality” is emphasized in
lucid detail.
If more physicists would only study Bell’s papers in-
stead of relying on dubious secondary reports, they
would, I think, come to appreciate that there really is
here a serious inconsistency to worry about. A much
higher-level inconsistency between quantum theory and
(general) relativity has been the impetus, in recent
decades, for enormous efforts spent pursuing (what Bell
once referred to as) “presently fashionable ‘string theo-
ries’ of ‘everything’.” (1990, p. 235) How might a reso-
lution of the more basic inconsistency identified by Bell
shed light on (or radically alter the motivation and con-
text for) attempts to quantize gravity? We can’t possibly
know until (perhaps long after) we face up squarely to
Bell’s important insights.
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